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ARGUMENT
In this case Sprint contracted with another entity, Group Lotto to send out spam
emails. Gillman, after having contacted Group Lotto and requested that he be taken off their
emailing list, received an email soliciting Sprint's wares. The trial court gave summary
judgment in favor of Sprint for one reason only. It found that in its view, Gillman had once
had a relationship with Group Lotto, who actually sent the email. This was enough for the
trial court to determine that Gillman, or any other recipient of email in Utah, could never do
anything to effectively terminate a previously existing relationship. This of course, subjects
all Utah email users to whatever barrage of emails can be sent, so long as they are sent by
some entity with some link to another with whom a relationship once existed. Because
virtually everyone who uses email has a relationship with some commercial entity, everyone
is subject to receive spam email, notwithstanding the Utah legislature's intentions to protect
its residents.
The lower court's ruling destroys the effectiveness of the Utah Unsolicited
Commercial and Sexually Explicit Email Act, Utah Code Ann. § 13-36-101, et seq.
(hereinafter the^ "Spam Act"). That ruling should be reversed.
Sprint in its Appellee brief, makes several arguments against reversal of the trial
court's decision. First, it argues that the statute should be read literally and "under the plain
language" and not interpreted. The plain language the trial court used and the plain
language Sprint encourages this court to use is not, however, the language used in the
statute. Second, Sprint argues that the words of the existing statute should be interpreted to
1

include definitions and meaning not contained in it, specifically to require an additional
period of time for the revocation of a relationship. There is no such requirement in the
statute, and the statute should not receive a judicial amendment. Thirdly, Sprint argues it
could not be liable for the unsolicited email because it did not actually send the email.
Sprint makes this argument even while admitting they did cause the email to be sent, an act
that is also covered by the statute. Finally, Sprint argues that if this Court finds Sprint
actually is liable for the unsolicited emails, as the trial court did, the Act should be found
unconstitutional. This issue, however, was never treated by the trial court, was not an issue
brought to this Court by Gillman, and was not brought as a cross appeal. Those arguments,
although wrong, should not be reached but should instead be stricken.
Each of Sprint's arguments lack merit. The decision of the trial court should be
reversed. Furthermore, Gillman procedurally requested the summary judgment be continued
to allow for rule 56(f) discovery to occur. This request was denied. As demonstrated by the
facts in each parties' briefs, there was no possible way for Gillman to disprove by his own
affidavit the assertions made by Defendants' affidavits. He simply did not possess that
knowledge. That knowledge could only be obtained through discovery. The only manner to
fully justify Gillman's opposition would be to use information that would only be obtainable
through discovery. This was not allowed by the trial court and is an error that should be
reversed.
I.

Any Previously Existing Relationship Between Gillman and Any of the
Players in this Scheme Was Terminated and Therefore Cannot Be Found
to Be Preexisting.
9

Sprint has now argued in its brief that Gillman at one time had a business relationship
with Group Lotto. See Appellee brief p. 11. This relationship remained unrecognized by
Gillman until he unsubscribed from their mailing list. It is difficult yet to understand how
Sprint can allege a commercial relationship between a SPAMMER and an unknowing and
unwilling recipient. Nevertheless, all parties have agreed that a request to unsubscribe from
Group Lotto's mailing list was sent by Gillman and received by Group Lotto on May 14,
2002, (see Ct. R. p. 363, Second Affidavit of Terry Gillman, f 4; Ct. Rec. p. 313, Affidavit
of Kate Vein, f 9) and that Gillman was actually unsubscribed from their list on May 15,
2002, (see Ct. Rec. p. 313, Affidavit of Kate Vein, f 9) thus terminating the existence of any
relationship between Gillman and Group Lotto on that date. It is equally undisputed that
Gillman never had a business relationship with Sprint.
The Utah Spam Act prohibits the sending of unsolicited commercial email through
the intermediary of an email service in the state or to an email address held by a resident of
the state, unless the sender complies with certain requirements, the sender has the recipient's
express permission, or there exists a preexisting business or personal relationship between
the one causing it to be sent and the recipient. See Utah Code Ann. § 13-36-102 & 103(1).
If there is a preexisting business or personal relationship, the email is not "unsolicited/' See
Utah Code Ann. § 13-36-102(8)(b).
The interpretation of the word "preexisting" was the determining factor for the trial
court's ruling of summary judgment. The trial court based its entire decision on an
interpretation of the word "preexist." Ct. Rec. p. 511. Although the definition it relied upon
3

may be correct, that however, is not the word in the statute. The word in the statute is
"preexisting." See Utah Code Ann. § 13-36-102(8)(b).
Well-settled rules of statutory interpretation for this Court instruct us that:
"[w]hen interpreting a statute, [the] court looks first to the statute's plain
language to determine the Legislature's intent and purpose. We read the plain
language of the statute as a whole, and interpret its provisions in harmony
with other statutes in the same chapter and related chapters. We follow the
"cardinal rule that the general purpose, intent and purport of the whole act
shall control, and that all the parts be interpreted as subsidiary and harmonious
to its manifest object."
Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12, f 17, 66 P.3d 592 (citations omitted). Moreover, Utah courts
have found that:
"[sjtatutes are considered to be in pari materia and thus must be construed
together when they relate to the same person or thing, to the same class of
persons or things, or have the same purpose or object. If it is natural or
reasonable to think that the understanding of the legislature or of persons
affected by the statute would be influenced by another statute, then those
statutes should be construed to be in pari materia, construed with reference
to one another and harmonized if possible."
Utah County v. Orem City, 699 P.2d 707, 709 (Utah 1985) (footnotes omitted).
Additionally, Utah courts have found that "[a] fundamental rule of statutory construction is
that statutes-are-to be construed according to their plain language." Arndt v. First Interstate
Bank, 991 P.2d 584, 586 (Utah 1999) (quoting O-Keefe v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 956
P.2d 279, 281 (Utah 1998)) and "where the statutory language is plain and unambiguous,
we do not look beyond the statute's plain meaning to divine legislative intent." Horton v.
Royal Order of the Sun, 821 P. 2d 1167, 1168 (Utah 1991). These cases were relied upon
in the trial court's ruling. See Ct. Rec. pp. 511, Memorandum Decision and Order on
4

Defendant Sprint's Motion for Summary Judgment, ^[19. Although these authorities were
cited, the interpretation of the statute made by the trial court and supported by Sprint,
destroys the entire meaning and effect of the Spam Act and cannot be the intention of the
Utah legislature. It violates the very principles of the cases cited.
The plain language of the statute provides a remedy only to the recipient of an
unsolicited commercial or sexually explicit email. If a recipient such as Gillman, cannot
qualify for this because at any time in the past, he had a relationship with some entity, the
statute offers essentially no protection to anyone. Everyone who uses email can be found
to have a commercial or personal relationship with someone or some entity. As long as a
SPAMMER can link itself to that person or entity, they avoid all liability under that
interpretation. For that matter, advertisers such as Sprint, would avoid all liability. This
cannot be the intention of the statute.
In the legal realm, the word "preexisting" is used in several different areas, in each
however, it connotes the same meaning. For example it is used in tort law, when there is a
preexisting condition that might be exacerbated by a tortfeasor's actions, (See eg. Jackson
v. Mateus, 70 P.3d 78 (Utah 2003) (preexisting autoimmune disorder aggravated by cat
bite)). Utah courts have used it in workers' compensation contexts. (See eg. Allen v. Indus,
Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15, 25 (Utah 1986) ("[A] claimant with a preexisting condition must
show that the employment contributed something substantial to increase the risk he already
faced in everyday life because of his condition."); see also Acosta v. Labor Comm., 44 P.3d
819 (Utah 2002) (The Commission ruled that because Acosta has a preexisting condition
5

that contributed to her injury, she was subject to the legal causation test enunciated in Allen
v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986), and that she did not meet the Allen
test.)). Utah courts have also used it in medical practice claims. (See eg. Hirpa v. IHC
Hospitals, Inc., 948 P.2d 785, 793 (Utah 1997), (where the court held that Utah's Good
Samaritan Act, Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-23 (1996), applies only to medical doctors who
had no preexisting duty to render aid.)). Preexisting has also been used by Utah courts in
property dispute contexts to show that a boundary by acquiescence claim that existed prior
to a tax deed claim, continued to exist after the tax deed claim was determined. See Mason
v. Loveless, 2001 UT App 145, 24 P.3d 997 (Utah 2001). In each of these cases, the court
used the word preexisting in a context where the prior existing condition continued to exist
at the time of the cause of action. This is after all the plain meaning of the word.
In other legal contexts, "preexisting duty," is defined in the Black's Law Dictionary,
as "a common law rule which holds that where a party does or promises to do what he or she
is already legally obligated to do, there exists no sufficient consideration to support this new
promise."

See Black's Law Dictionary 815 (6th ed. 1991).

In other words, the

consideration is not sufficient because there was already a duty which remained at the time
the promise or action was made.
The Utah legislature has used preexisting in other statutory contexts, the majority of
which center around preexisting conditions and the way they are treated by insurance
companies.

Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-1406(l) defines preexisting condition as "a

condition for which medical advice or treatment was recommended by or received from a
6

provider of health care services, within six months preceding the effective date of coverage
of an insured person." That same section further requires that a preexisting condition must
not be defined more restrictive than the abovementioned definition. Id. The Utah legislature
in that instance confines "preexisting" to the prior six months, but includes up to the date
of coverage. The condition existed before the application, and continues to exist at the time
the insurance was applied for.
Each of these examples demonstrate the requirement of continuation of the matter at
the time the dispute becomes at issue. The same must hold true as to the intentions of the
Utah legislature in this Act.
Further review of the grammatical sense of the statute was already offered in
Gillman's Appeal brief and will not be repeated here. It only makes sense however for the
word to be interpreted in accordance with it's plain meaning, to require the existence of a
relationship at the time of reception of the email. The statute after all uses the word
preexisting, not preexist.
Gillman expressly revoked any subscription he had to receive spam emails from
Group Lotto. See Ct. Rec. p. 363. Sprint admits, and in fact relies upon the fact that Group
Lotto actually did unsubscribe Gillman from their emailing list. See Ct. Rec. p. 316.
Nevertheless, after such a revocation and the actual unsubscription actually occurred, Sprint
caused an email to be sent to Gillman. See Ct. Rec. p. 316. At that time there did not exist
any relationship between Gillman and Group Lotto. See Ct. Rec. p. 317. Neither did there
exist, nor has there ever, a relationship between Gillman and Sprint. See Ct. Rec. p. 363. The
7

email was therefore "unsolicited" under the definition of the statute, and Sprint should
therefore be found liable for causing the email to be sent.
n.

The Utah Statute Provides No Requirement for an Extended Period of
Time for Revocation, and Such a Requirement Should Not Be Read into
It

The Spam Act provides a remedy for the recipients of unsolicited commercial or
sexually explicit emails. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 13-36-101, et seq. There is no mention
of a revocation of any preexisting relationship, nor is there any mention of a reasonable time
for unsubscription requests to be processed, as Sprint requests that the Court add to the
statute. The reasonable interpretation of the statute, should therefore be made according to
its plain meaning, and no additional terms should be added. See Assoc. Gen Contrs. V. Bd.
Of Oil Gas & Mining, 2001 UT 112 f 30, 38 P.3d 291, 301 (When statutory language is
unambiguous, the Court is not at liberty to "infer substantive terms into the text that are not
already there"), quoting Berrett v. Purser & Edwards, 876 P.2d 367, 370 (Utah 1994); see
also In re I.M.L. v. UtaK 2002 UT 110 f 25, 61 P.3d 1038 (Utah 2002). If the terms are not
in the statute, it is the Utah legislature's prerogative to include or not to include them.
Because the-terms are not included, the only reasonable interpretation from the actual statute
is that once there is no longer a preexisting relationship, the email becomes unsolicited.
Sprint argues alternatively that each SPAMMER should be allowed some time after
an unsubscription request has been made to actually unsubscribe the targeted recipients.
Other states have included such language, although the actual lengths of time allowed by

8

each of the state statutes cited is different from the next. This only emphasizes the Utah
legislature's prerogative not to include one at all.
Furthermore, Sprint relies upon "undisputed" testimony of Jared Brody, the vice
president of Traffix. Although this will be discussed below, Gillman has had no opportunity
to properly dispute such testimony. Gillman does not work in the emailing industry and has
no knowledge to dispute such testimony. A proper dispute could only come about through
discovery. Nevertheless, Mr. Brody testifies it is industry standard for it to take two to three
days to process an unsubscription request. See Ct. Rec. pp. 138-9. Notwithstanding that
testimony, he also states it only took Traffix one day to unsubscribe Gillman. See Ct. Rec.
p. 139. Regardless of the industry standard, Gillman was in actuality unsubscribed before
the unsolicited email was actually sent. See Ct. Rec. p. 316. How long it takes to remove
an email address from the email queue is a fact not in evidence, but which would be crucial
to discover before a ruling of summary judgment should be made.
III.

Sprint Caused The Unsolicited Email to Be Sent and Should Therefore
Be Liable for its Actions.

Sprint contends "there is no evidence in this case that Sprint has ever encouraged,
requested, or otherwise caused the sending of commercial email to non-consenting
recipients, much less to Gillman." Appellee Brief p. 22. For this argument, it claims it
should be relieved of all liability for an email marketing program and the associated
solicitations it contracted for, paid for, and ultimately caused to be sent.

9

The trial court found otherwise. In its ruling the court states: "liability attaches under
the Act to '[e]ach person who sends or causes to be sent an unsolicited commercial email.'
§ 13-36-103 (emphasis added). By hiring Traffix and its subsidiary GroupLotto to advertise
on its behalf, Sprint 'caused' the email at issue to be sent to Gillman." See Ct. Rec. p. 509,
Mem. ^ 12. The lower court found Sprint to be the liable party, not GroupLotto or Traffix
or any other party. See Ct. Rec. p. 509, Mem. <|[ 12. This only makes common sense, since
the email was sent to advertise Sprint services and would not have been sent at all if Sprint
had not paid to have it sent. Therefore, Sprint is clearly responsible and the Statute clearly
targets one who "causes it to be sent" as Sprint did here.
Section 13-36-103(3) Utah Code Annotated (2002) states, "If the recipient of an
unsolicited commercial email or an unsolicited sexually explicit email notifies the sender
that the recipient does not want to receive future commercial email or future sexually explicit
email, respectively, the sender may not send that recipient a commercial email or a sexually
explicit email, as the case may be, either directly or through a subsidiary or affiliate."
Ut. Code Ann. § 13-36-103(3) (Emphasis added). Just as paragraph 1 creates liability for
that entity that "sends or causes to be sent'' paragraph 3 continues that liability to those who
directly or through an affiliate (as we have here), send offending emails. Sprint did not
directly send the offending email, but its affiliate, GroupLotto, did at Sprint's insistence.
Gillman never had a relationship with Sprint, and any relationship with GroupLotto had
been terminated several days before it sent the offending email. Sprint never acquired a

10

relationship with Gillman merely by hiring a SPAMMER. Even if it were possible to hire
a SPAMMER to buy a relationship, that would not work in the facts of this case. Here
Gillman had terminated whatever relationship once existed.
IV.

Sprint's Constitutional Arguments Are Not Presentable Arguments in
this Context and Must Be Stricken,

Sprint includes lengthy argument in support of its position that the Act is
unconstitutional, which Sprint argues gives this Court one more reason to affirm the trial
court's decision. However, Gillman has at no time presented any constitutional arguments
for review by the Court in this appeal. It was never the subject of any ruling by the trial
court. See Memorandum Decision ("Because the Court grants summary judgment to Sprint
on statutory grounds, it need not reach Sprint's constitutional arguments. See Utahy^ Wood,
648 P.2d 71, 82 (Utah 1982) (citing Hoyle v. Monson, 606 P.2d 240 (Utah 1980)) ("It is a
fundamental rule that we should avoid addressing a constitutional issue unless required to
do so.")) Nor has Sprint presented any sort of cross-appeal to include those arguments. That
being the case, without a final order concerning these matters, this Court is without
jurisdiction to address them. See State v. Norris, 2002 UT App 305, f 1, 57 P.3d 238
("[WJithout a final order on the record, [this] court has no jurisdiction to hear an appeal.").
Because these issues were not raised by Gillman in this appeal, this Court should not
consider them. See Holmes Dev., LLC v. Cook, 2002 UT 38, f 54,48 P.3d 895 ("By failing
to address these issues on appeal, [appellant] has waived any appeal with respect to [its]
negligence and negligent misrepresentation causes of action."); Pasquin v. Pasquin, 1999
11

UT App 245, f 21,988 P.2d 1 ("[Appellees] assert that [appellant] has waived any challenge
to this ruling by failing to raise, brief, or argue the issue. We agree."), cert, denied, 994 P.2d
1271 (Utah 2000). Those arguments are therefore improperly before the Court at this time
and should be summarily stricken.
V.

Even Should this Court Find it to Have Jurisdiction to Hear the
Constitutional Issues, Sprint's Constitutional Arguments Are
Unpersuasive.
A.

The Act Does Not Violate the Dormant Commerce Laws.

Courts in several States that have passed similar anti-spamming laws have upheld
their constitutionality and found them not to be in violation of the dormant commerce clause.
Utah's statute is modeled after and similar to the Washington State statute (RCW 19.190).
The Washington statute was challenged in State v. Heckel, 24 P.3d 404 (Wash. 2001). The
question was whether such a limitation on unwanted email unconstitutionally burdened
interstate commerce. The litigation went through the trial court and ultimately was reviewed
by the Washington Supreme Court.
The conclusion of Washington's Supreme Court was that the statute was valid,
enforceable, and did not unreasonably interfere with interstate commerce. The court,
quoting from an earlier Washington Supreme Court decision reasoned when "the statute
regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on
interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. If a legitimate local
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purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden
that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and
on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities." State
v. Heckler, quoting from Franks & Son, Inc. v. State, 136 Wn2d 737, 754, 966 P.2d 1232
(1998); citing fxomPike v. Bruce Church Inc. 397 U.S. 137,142,90 S.Ct. 844, 849 (1970).
The Washington court noted the statute was not discriminatory, it dealt evenhandedly with
in-state and out-of-state SPAMMERS. Id. So does the Utah statute. There are not separate
or different requirements for one sender versus any other. The court further noted the
benefits outweighed any burden imposed. Id. This is the main thrust of Sprint's argument.
They claim that the affirmative burden imposed by the Act is much greater than the putative
local benefits. This cannot be true, as discussed above.
Since the time of the decision in State v. Heckel, the volume of spam has increased.
In an article in the Salt Lake Tribune on May 13, 2002, it was noted that some estimates are
that "spam volume has more than doubled in the past six months alone." The article further
states :
"Internet researcher Jupiter Media Metrix predicts the traffic will double again over
the next four years, topping 206 billion junk e-mails in 2006, an average of 1,400 per
person. And, with spam clogging anywhere from 20 to 80 percent of employees'
inboxes each day, businesses are beginning to pay the price, too. How much? No
firm estimates exist for the United States, but it surely is in the billions of dollars: A
European union study recently estimated the spam price tag worldwide at $16.8
billion a year, with lost productivity around $960 per employee."
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Bob Mims, Barrage of unsolicited e-mail a growing Net plague, S. L. Tribune, May 13,
2002 at D 1-2. This is the real burden. Sprint would have us believe it is a greater burden
to place a few extra items using a "macro" on their email. But this is not the real burden.
The burden is in the millions of dollars in Utah employee time, resources, personal time, and
other results caused by the reception of the unwanted junk email. The burden placed on
spam senders is not "clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits." C & A
Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994). The problem is getting
worse, not better, the legislature has seen and recognized this problem and this legislation
is their way to eliminate the unwanted burden on commerce.
B.

The Statute Complies with the Requirements of the First
Amendment.

Any First Amendment argument also comes up short. In Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407
U.S. 551 (1972), protestors of the Vietnam War sought to pass out written materials in a
private shopping center. Even though the customers of the shopping center were the
intended recipients of the communication, the Supreme Court held that allowing the First
Amendment to trump private property rights is unwarranted where there are adequate
alternative avenues of communication. Id. at 567. The Supreme Court stated that:
Although . . . the courts properly have shown a special solicitude for the guarantees
of the First Amendment, this Court has never held that a trespasser or an uninvited
guest may exercise general rights offree speech on property privately owned and
used nondiscriminatorily for private purposes only.
Id. at 567-68 (emphasis added).
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Sprint has adequate alternative means of communication available to them. They can
continue to send electronic messages to any resident in Utah, so long as they provide the
applicable statutory protection. They are also free to send email advertisements to those on
the Internet who are not residents of Utah.

They can communicate via web page

advertisements, facsimile transmissions, through more conventional means such as the U.S.
mail, radio or telemarketing. Sprint can hire a spokesperson on television. Any contention
that there are no adequate alternative means of communication is false. The Lloyd court
elaborated: "The First and Fourteenth Amendments have never been treated as absolutes.
Freedom of speech or press does not mean that one can talk or distribute where, when and
how one chooses." Breardv. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642 (1951).
In the present case, Gillman is physically the recipient of the Sprint's messages and
is the owner of the property upon which the transgression is occurring. Gillman is not a
government agency or state actor which seeks to preempt Sprint's ability to communicate
but is instead a private citizen attempting to protect private property rights.
The situation at hand is analogous to a series of cases involving businesses who faxed
advertisements. In Destination VentureSr-Ltd v. F.C.C., 46 F.3d 54 (9th Cir. 1995), the
plaintiff asserted and lost a First Amendment challenge to a provision of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA) which bans unsolicited faxes that contain
advertisements.

The plaintiff in Destination Ventures would send unsolicited faxes

advertising seminars for travel agents. The Court found these unsolicited faxes cost the
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recipients money, resources, and time, effectively shifting the costs of advertising to the
consumers. The court held that "[bjecause Congress's goal was to prevent the shifting of
advertising costs, limiting its regulation to faxes containing advertising was justified. The
ban is even-handed, in that it applies to commercial solicitation by any organization, be it
a multinational corporation or the Girl Scouts." Id. at 56.
The same rationale should be applied to this case. Sprint is effectively doing the same
thing Destination was by advertising and shifting its costs to the consumers. It is the Internet
user who pays for these spam email advertisements with their resources, time, and computer
space.
"Defendants raise First Amendment concerns and argue that an injunction will
adversely impact the public interest. High volumes of junk e-mail devour computer
processing and storage capacity, slow down data transfer between computers over the
Internet by congesting the electronic paths through which the messages travel, and
cause recipients to spend time and money wading through messages that they do not
want. It is ironic that if defendants were to prevail on their First Amendment
arguments, the viability of electronic mail as an effective means of communication
for the rest of society would be put at risk."
CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F.Supp. 1015, 1028 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
This act does not violate the First Amendment. In Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dept.y 397
U.S. 728 (1970) the United States Supreme Court held the First Amendment did not forbid
federal legislation that allowed addressees to remove themselves from mailing lists and stop
all future mailings. The Court stated that the "mailer's right to communicate must stop at the
mailbox of an unreceptive addressee. . . . [t]o hold less would be to license a form of
trespass[.]" Id. at 736-37,90 S.Ct. at 1490. In Tillman v. Distribution Sys. OfAmerica, Inc.,
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224 A.D.2d 79, 648 N.Y.S.2d 630 (1996) the plaintiff complained the defendant continued
to throw newspapers on his property after being warned not to do so. The court held the
defendant newspaper distributor had no First Amendment right to continue to throw
newspapers onto the property of the plaintiff. After discussing the Supreme Court cases of
Rowan and Breard, supra, the court pointed out:
"The most critical and fundamental distinction between the cases cited above, on the
one hand, and the present case, on the other, is based on the fact that here we are not
dealing with a government agency which seeks to preempt in some way the ability
of a publisher to contact a potential reader; rather, we are dealing with a reader who
is familiar with a publisher's product, and who is attempting to prevent the unwanted
dumping of this product on his property. None o_f the cases cited by the defendants
stands for the proposition that the Free Speech Clause prohibits such a landowner
from resorting to his common-law remedies in order to prevent such unwanted
dumping. There is, in our view, nothing in either the Federal or State Constitutions
which requires a landowner to tolerate a trespass whenever the trespasser is a
speaker, or the distributor of written speech, who is unsatisfied with the fora which
may be available on public property, and who thus attempts to carry his message to
private property against the will of the owner."
Id. 648 N.Y.S.2d at 635. The court concluded, relying on Lloyd, supra, that the property
rights of the private owner could not be overwhelmed by the First Amendment. Id. 648
N.Y.S.2d at 636. In the present case, Gillman is physically the recipient of Sprint's
messages and is the owner of the property upon which the transgression is occuiring.
Gillman is not a government agency or state actor which seeks to preempt Sprint's ability
to communicate but is instead a private party who is attempting to protect his own property.
This is a trespass to Gillman's chattel. The First Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides no defense for such conduct.

17

Sprint also argues the statute cannot meet the requirements of the Central Hudson
four part commercial speech test. Gillman does not dispute the email might be considered
commercial speech. He does however dispute the statute cannot meet that standard. When
reviewing commercial speech, [t]he reviewing court is to apply the intermediate level of
scrutiny to the regulation of commercial speech. See Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515
U.S. 618, 623, 132 L.Ed.2d 541, 115 S.Ct. 2371 (1995). The determination of the
appropriateness of state regulation of commercial speech, then, involves a four-part
analysis: (1) the expression must be protected by the first amendment; (2) the asserted
government interest must be substantial; (3) the regulation must directly advance the
governmental interest asserted; and (4) the regulation must be no more extensive than
necessary to serve the interest. See Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Comm% 447 U.S. 557, 565-66, 65 L.Ed.2d 341,100 S.Ct. 2343 (1980). In order to satisfy
the last prong, the state must show not that the regulation is the least restrictive means but
that it is narrowly tailored to achieve the desired result. See Board of Trustees of State
University ofNew York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469,480,106 L.Ed.2d 388,109 S.Ct. 3028 (1989).
The statute meets each of the four requirements and therefore does not violate Sprint's free
speech rights.
Sprint does not dispute the email was neither misleading, nor related to an unlawful
activity. However, it was sent in violation of the law. To that end it is an unlawful activity
and therefore it is not protectable under the First Amendment.
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"The Supreme Court has made clear '[a]ny First Amendment interest which might
be served by advertising an ordinary commercial proposal and which might arguably
outweigh the governmental interest supporting the regulation is altogether absent
when the commercial activity itself is illegal and the restriction on advertising is
incidental to a valid limitation on economic activity.'"
Ford Motor Co. v. Texas Dept of Transp., 264 F.3d 493 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Pittsburgh
Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376,389,93 S.Ct. 2553,
2561 (1973)). If found to be true, the court need go no further, for a finding the speech is
either illegal or misleading is not protected by the First Amendment. See Central Hudson.
Even so, the other elements of the test will be examined.
The second prong of the test requires the governmental interest be substantial. Sprint
claims there is not a substantial interest in keeping one's private email box free from
unwanted spam or that the wasted time of thousands of citizens is not substantial. Sprint
claims the resources wasted by requiring Utah residents to check through unwanted email,
nor the added costs of using the Internet by them is not substantial. And Sprint claims that
these lost resources on the one hand by Utah residents are less than the additional time that
would be required by defendant if they met the requirements set forth by the statute. These
requirements are not difficult, nor would they add costs to Sprint's spam sending practices.
They require the inclusion of a legal name, a correct street address, a valid Internet domain
name, symbols included in the subject line of the email indicating the type of message it is,
a convenient no-cost mechanism to notify the sender not to send further emails, and a short
notice. See U.C.A. § 13-36-103(1). Sprint could do this as a "macro" function and add
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them to each email they send by a single button. The ease with which Sprint could comply
in comparison with the extraordinary expense and difficulty visited on the Utah public by
Sprint's refusal to comply makes it clear that their argument is not well taken.
Additionally, however, the Utah Supreme Court has found that the operation of a
public business is a substantial interest and is an interest mentioned in the legislative
hearings. See Utah Licensed Beverage Ass 'n. v. Leavitt, 256 F.3d 1061 (10th Cir. 2001).
The legislative record as cited by Sprint is indicative of this interest. Representative Arent
stated in the January 25, 2002 floor debate, that:
"[i]t costs the same for a sender of the email to send 10 messages or 10 million
messages. The cost to businesses are dramatic. I've talked to many
businesses who say it is just difficult for them. The have perhaps 200 or 300
terminals. They .all receive SPAM. It takes a lot of employee time to get rid
of it. According to a recent study, the average employee spend 10 minutes a
day, and that's going up, just reviewing and deleting SPAM."
Floor Debate, 54th Utah Leg., Gen. Sess. (Jan. 25, 2002). If this is not a substantial
government interest, it is difficult to determine what is.
Meeting the second prong of the test, the third prong is easily met. The third prong
requires that the regulation must directly advance the governmental interest, which it does.
The regulation requires the sender of the email to make it easy for a recipient to avoid spam
if they so desire. The requirements of the statute directly advance that inlerest.
The fourth requirement is also met. These regulations are no more extensive than
necessary. They do not destroy a business's ability to advertise it's products or services.
They do not even prohibit the sending of spam, except to those who have requested not to
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receive it. Even then, as long as they pay each recipient $10.00 or actual damages they can
continue the practice. (If they did that voluntarily they might actually generate good-will
from spam.) SPAMMERS are still able to send their advertisements to all others, as long
as those simple requirements mentioned above are met. The statute does not violate the First
Amendment.
C.

The Act Does Not Violate Defendant's Due Process Rights.

Sprint argues the Act violates it's due process rights because as they claim it is
unconstitutionally vague or because they were unaware of the violations that had occurred.
These claims in and of themselves are vague and unfounded.
The meaning of the statute appears to be clear. If a business wants to send or cause
to be sent unsolicited commercial advertisements over the Internet, it must meet those few
requirements outlined in the statute. If the recipient asks not to receive the email, the
business may not send the email to that recipient unless they want to pay them $10.00 or
actual damages. The statute also allows for the sending of email to those addresses where
there existed a pre-existing business or personal relationship without complying with these
terms. Although Sprint claims the statute is vague, Sprint employs a deliberate_reading
impairment and not one caused by the statute. Sprint claims not to know what is a preexisting relationship. This is not difficult: Does Sprint do business with Mr. Gillman? If
so, there is such a relationship. If not, there isn't one. This is not vague. Nor is there such
a relationship in this case.
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Sprint's second due process argument is that they cannot be deterred because they did
not push the send button or because they did not have knowledge of it. Sprint contracted
with Traffix, Inc. to send emails. Traffix, Inc. caused one of their subsidiaries, Group Lotto,
to send the email. If Sprint had not hired people to send their junk email, it would not have
reached Mr. Gillman. They are the cause of the illegal email and must be held accountable.
If Sprint is able to claim they are not responsible for sending the email, the statute is
meaningless. All that would need to be done in order to avoid liability under the statute is
to separate the beneficiary of the advertisement by an intermediary from the sender of the
email and assure the intermediary is judgment proof. This would frustrate the statute.
Sprint's interpretation must be rejected.
VI.

Gillman Should Be Entitled to Conduct Discovery pursuant to his Rule
56(f) motion.

In this case, Gillman's Motion was made and filed in October, 2002, discovery was
not completed, in fact the process was never allowed to begin. See Ct. Rec. pp. 194-99.
There were no interrogatories, no requests for admission, no requests for production, no
depositions.
Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: "Should it appear from
the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the application for
judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to
be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just."
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The Utah Supreme Court has held on "numerous occasions that rule 56(f) motions
opposing a summary judgment motion on the ground that discovery has not been completed
should be granted liberally unless they are deemed dilatory or lacking in merit." Salt Lake
County v. Western Dairymen Coop, 48 P.3d 910 (Utah 2002) (citing Price Dev. Co. v. Orem
City, 995 P.2d 1237 (Utah 2000); Crossland Sav. v. Hatch, 877 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1994); and
Coxv. Winters, 678 P.2d 311 (Utah 1984)).
Sprint argues that because of the discovery stipulation entered into by these parties,
that Gillman has waived away all right to conduct discovery until after the summary
judgment motion had been ruled upon. This however, is exactly the purpose of Rule 56(f),
to provide for the opportunity to conduct discovery when it becomes evident that the
information at the hands of the non-movant is not adequate to address the allegations of the
movant's affidavits. Gillman has been completely barred from doing this. Throughout this
brief there have been cited instances where if discovery would have been allowed, the trial
court would have been able to make a more informed decision. For example the issue of the
"queue." Mr. Jared Brody of Traffix testifies that it is industry standard to process an
unsubscription request within 2 or 3 days. See Ct. Rec. p. 317. Gillman has had no chance
to even determine how Mr. Brody claims to have gained this knowledge. Nor has there been
any opportunity to depose real internet experts in this area to controvert that testimony.
Sprint is correct when it alleges that Gillman has not disputed many of the facts set forth by
it.

This is because Gillman did not possess knowledge to dispute such facts. Gillman
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simply received an email after he requested not to be sent emails. Denying Gillman the
opportunity to conduct discovery at this point severely prejudices him in the prosecution of
this matter. The denial by the trial court of Gillman's Rule 56(f) motion was in error and
should be reversed.
CONCLUSION
Sprint caused an email to be sent to Mr. Gillman. Gillman complained about that
below. The lower court strained and distorted the statute to grant summary judgment against
Gillman and in favor of Sprint. That summary judgment should be reversed.
The constitutional issues raised by Sprint for the first time on appeal should be
stricken. As should the Due Process arguments.
DATED this

/

day of January, 2004.
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